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]
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]

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the court of appeals by
provision of Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(f).

ISSUES AND STANDARDS
1. What is the extent of a probationer's protection under the Fourth
Amendment? R 259-64. This is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. State v.
Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256,1271 (Utah 1993).
2. Can an offender be required, as a condition of his release on probation, to
waive all protection which the Fourth Amendment extends to probationers? R 264.
Question of law. Id.
3. Did defendant effectively and voluntarily waive the protection which the
Fourth Amendment would have otherwise extended to him as a probationer? R 264. The

issue of the waiver of constitutional rights is arguably a mixed question of law and fact,
but tlie courts indulge every reasonable presumption against such a waiver. See Wagstaff
v.Barnes, 802 P.2d 774 (Utah App. 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The text of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States
is set out in Addendum A.1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case. This is an appeal from a judgment, sentence, and probation order of
the Fifth Judicial District Court, in and for Washington County, State of Utah, the
Honorable James L. Shumate presiding, by which defendant was adjudged guilty of
POSSESSION OF a CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-8(2) (a) (I) and -8(5)(v),(ix).
Course of the Proceedings. Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine
and drug paraphernalia (within 1000 feet of a public park), a second degree felony and
class A misdemeanor, respectively. R 1-2. These charges arose out of the execution of a
searc ti warrant which purported to authorize the search of a certain residence and all
persons present at the time of its execution. R 277-80.

^Tie relevant Utah cases are decided under the Fourth Amendment and do not invoke any
provision of the state constitution. Defendant is not prepared to argue that Article I, section 14, of
the Utah Constitution extends any greater protection to probationers than does the Fourth
Amendment.
2

Following preliminary hearing, defendant was ordered to answer the
controlled substance charge. The paraphernalia charge was dismissed for lack of evidence.
Rl-2.
Defendant had previously plead guilty to attempted burglary and was on
supervised probation when he was searched by peace officers and charged in the instant
proceedings. R 59-60, 251-52. His probation agreement included conditions requiring him
to submit to warrantless, reasonable-suspicion

searches at the request of probation

officers. R 59-60, 267-69. The final pleadings in the attempted burglary case were not
signed until after the incident which underlies this case. The written probation order
included language requiring defendant to submit to searches of his person, possessions,
and residence at the request of peace officers. R 59-60, 258.
Following his arraignment, defendant moved the district court to quash the
search warrant and suppress the evidence obtained in the execution thereof. R 20-21. He
contended that the police-officer affiant who applied for the search warrant had, in an
attempt to bolster the credibility of his undisclosed informant, falsely described the
informant as "a citizen with no motive to fabricate and nothing to gain from providing this
information/ 7 R 63,159. The undisclosed informant was one Kelly Moore. R 157. In fact,
Moore then facing criminal charges in three separate proceedings, one of which was a
felony charge which was pending preliminary hearing. R 160.
Defendant subpoenaed Moore to testify at the suppression hearing. R 28-29.
When Moore failed to obey the subpoena, defendant proceeded as far as he could without
3

his testimony. R 247. The district court issued a bench warrant for Moore's arrest and
continued the hearing. R 33-34, 202. Although the preliminary hearing was ultimately
continued three times, defendant was never able to compel Moore's attendance as a
witness. R202.
Because defendant had not been able to secure pretrial release, defense
counsel finally asked the court to rule on defendant's motion to suppress based upon the
testimony which the court had already heard. R 266. Counsel asked that in the event the
court sustained the search warrant, defendant be allowed to revisit the search issues when
and if Moore's attendance could be compelled. R 214, 266.
After expressing concern about the application for the search warrant but
without deciding whether or not the warrant had been properly issued, the district court
denied defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that (1) defendant had been
previously convicted of attempted burglary and was on supervised probation; (2) under
the terms of the order of probation, defendant was obliged to submit to search at the
request of any peace officer; and (3) even if the search warrant was improperly issued, the
supporting affidavit established "reasonable suspicion/ 7 R 267-69. The validity of the
search warrant became academic in light of the district court's ruling that the search could
have been conducted without a warrant.

Disposition at Trial Court. The case against defendant was tried to the bench and the
evidence obtained during the execution of the search warrant was received over objection.

4

R 286-87. Defendant was found guilty of possession of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony, and was sentenced according to statute. R 120-24, 373-74. The execution
of his sentence was stayed, and the defendant was placed on probation subject to certain
terms and conditions, including a directive that he submit to warrantless searches upon
the request of any peace officer. R 374-75.

RELEVANT FACTS
In the early afternoon of April 18,1995, St. George City police officers and
Washington County Sheriffs deputies executed a search warrant at the residence of one
Stanley Adams in Santa Clara, Utah. R 278-79. The warrant ordered peace officers to
search the residence "as well as all persons present during execution of the search
warrant" R 35-46. Because defendant was visiting friends at the Adams residence when
police officers arrived, his person was searched purportedly by authority of the warrant.
The state has not claimed that this was a probation search or that the agents of Adult
Probation and Parole participated in the execution of the search warrant.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Fourth Amendment extends its protection to probationers. However,
the supervisory power which a probation officer exercises over his probationer necessarily
places some legitimate limitations upon these rights. Nevertheless, a probationer cannot
be required, as a term of his probation, to submit to warrantless searches by members of

5

the general law enforcement community.
Defendant did not waive any Fourth Amendment right by signing the
probation agreement or by any other means. Even if the language of the probation
agreement could be construed as a waiver of all Fourth Amendment rights, its execution
did not constitute a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary waiver.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT EXTENDS ITS PROTECTION TO
PROBATIONERS.
Probationers enjoy protection under the Fourth Amendment. See State v.
Velasquez, 672 P.2d 1254 (Utah 1983).2 However, the courts are not in agreement
concerning the extent of that protection.

These differences can be, at least in part,

attributed to the theories that various jurisdictions have relied upon in withdrawing
Fourth Amendment protection.
In the past, some courts, including the Utah Supreme Court, relied on a
theory of "constructive custody" under which a probationer's Fourth Amendment rights
were compared to those of a prisoner. See Reeves v. Turner, 28 Utah 2d 310, 510 P.2d 1212

Velasquez involved the search of a parolee's residence. Counsel is not aware of any Utah cases
specifically involving probation searches. However, probationers' and parolees' Fourth Amendment
rights are arguably indistinguishable. See id. at 1258 n.2. See also State v. Blackwell, 809 P.2d
135, 137 n.2 (Utah App. 1991). "Probationer" will be used throughout this brief to refer to both
probationers and parolees unless clarity or the context requires a distinction.
6

(1972). This theory has been discredited. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1258 (citing Morrissey v.
Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1972)).
Other courts adopted an "act of grace1' or "implied consent" theory which was
based on the premise that since one who is convicted of a criminal offense has no right to
have the execution of his sentence suspended, the state may attach whatever conditions it
desires the extension of that "privilege."

"[It is now clear beyond question" that a

probationer's Fourth Amendment rights cannot be curtailed or extinguished by
categorizing probation as a "privilege" rather than a "right." See 4 W. LaFave, Search and
Seizure, §10.10(b) at 762 (3d ed. 1996).
Although it has been widely criticized, there is a theory of express "waiver"
which still enjoys some support. Under this theory, the offender is required to expressly
waive his Fourth Amendment rights at the time he is placed on probation. This implies
that the probationer's Fourth Amendment rights are intact and must be expressly waived,
thus inviting controversy concerning the fact, validity, and extent of the alleged waiver.
See id. at 763-66.
While the "constructive custody," "act of grace," and "waiver" theories are all
unsound, it does not necessarily follow that probationers enjoy the same protection under
the Fourth Amendment as does the general public. In Velasquez, the Utah Supreme Court
approved a warrantless search of a parolee's apartment supported only by "reasonable
suspicion."

The court adopted what it referred to as a "middle ground" approach:

"[Ajlthough a warrant based on probable cause is not generally required, a parole officer
7

must have reasonable grounds for investigating whether a parolee has violated the terms
of his parole or committed a crime." Id. at 1260.3
In this approach, our supreme court has distanced itself from all the theories
which have traditionally been used to justify or rationalize warrantless probation searches.
The court concluded that signing the standard supervision agreement "cannot itself
constitute a waiver of constitutional rights." Id. at 1260 n.4. The obligation to submit to
search is not based upon a theory that the probationer has waived any right. Cf. State v.
Blackwell, 809 P.2d at 138 n.4 (search upheld under a "reasonable suspicion" analysis, not
on grounds of waiver).
Without characterizing it as such, Velasquez employs an "administrative
search" theory under Fourth Amendment principles approved in Camara v. Municipal
Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), and its progeny. See generally, LaFave, §10.10(c) at 766-75.
Velasquez cites Camara, but it does so in such a manner that the reader does not
immediately recognize the fact that he is leaving the familiarity of the law of criminal
procedure, and drifting into strange channels of administrative law and regulatory
inspection: building, fire, and job safety, disease control, etc. Velasquez never undertakes

^ h e court later amplified this "reasonable suspicion" standard stating:
[T]o constitute a valid warrantless search, there must be evidence (1) that the
parole officer has a reasonable suspicion that the parolee has committed a
parole violation or crime, and (2) that the search is reasonably related to the
parole officer's duty.
State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069,1072 (Utah 1987).
8

a Camara-type analysis "balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search
entails." 387 U.S. at 537. The opinion discusses the competing needs and interests in
general terms. See 672 P.2d at 1258-59. The unstated conclusion: the search was not
"unreasonable" under the circumstances even in the absence of a warrant.
In State v. Cornwall 810 P.2d 484 (Utah App. 1991), the court of appeals
upheld an administrative search which had been conducted without a warrant. The search
in that case was a routine security screening of all persons entering the courthouse. The
procedure had been implemented by administrative order of Third District, Salt Lake
County. The court of appeals concluded that administrative searches are constitutionally
permissible without a warrant if the need to search justifies an intrusion 'consistent with
satisfaction of the administrative need."' Id. at 487 (citation omitted). Judge Orme's
concurring opinion highlights the fact that the administrative procedure had legitimate
objectives unrelated to criminal investigation and that no claim had been made that bailiffs
were using the procedure to make selective, arbitrary searches for investigative purposes.

4

In State v. Wasatch Metal & Salvage Co., 594 P.2d 894 (Utah 1979), the Utah Supreme Court
had struck down a section of the Utah Occupational Safety and Health Act which purported to
authorize warrantless administrative searches. Citing Camara and quoting from its progeny, the
supreme court concluded that in the context of an administrative search: "The showing of probable
cause necessary to secure a warrant may vary with the objection and obtrusiveness of the search, but
the necessity of the warrant persists." Id. at 897 (quoting Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 506
(1978), emphasis added). Velasquez cites Wasatch Metal without discussion. See 672 P.2d at 1260.
This is the only time a Utah appellate court has cited Wasatch Metal for any purpose. This case may
have been one reason why Velasquez seems to avoid the Camara "administrative search"
nomenclature.

9

See id. at 489.
Defendant concedes the legitimacy of an administrative approach to
probation searches. Although a probation violation may involve criminal conduct and
notwithstanding the fact that a violation, criminal or not, may have penal ramifications,
the state's "regulatory" interest is legitimate.
In Griffin V.Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987), the United States Supreme Court
dealt with a probation search that had been conducted pursuant to provisions of the
Wisconsin Administrative Code which established specific standards and procedures
regarding warrantless searches of probationers' homes upon "reasonable grounds." Griffin
clearly relies upon a Camara-type analysis.

The majority concluded that the state

regulatory scheme satisfied the Fourth Amendment although the state administrative
regulations did not require a warrant.
The Griffin majority concluded that "[a] warrant requirement would interfere
to an appreciable degree with the probation system, setting up a magistrate rather than the
probation officer as the judge of how close a supervision the probationer requires." Id. at
876. This language may mislead the casual reader in that it suggests that the probation
officer can formulate his own standards of supervision. One must not lose sight of the fact
that the underlying issue in Griffin was whether or not Wisconsin's administrative
regulation established a satisfactory standard for determining the propriety of conducting
a warrantless probation search. The Griffin majority held:

10

As his sentence for the commission of a crime, Griffin was committed
to the legal custody of the Wisconsin State Department of Health and
Social Services, and thereby made subject to that Department's rules
and regulations. The search of Griffin's home satisfied the demands
of the Fourth Amendment because it was carried out pursuant to a
regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness
requirement under well-established principles.
Id. at 872-73 (emphasis added). The probation officer's judgment must be exercised within
the parameters of established policies and standards which satisfy the Fourth Amendment.
Griffin is arguably comparable to the approach which the Utah Supreme
Court taken in Velasquez.5 Both cases deal with the Fourth Amendment rather than ignore
it by invoking some insupportable waiver theory. The limits of the state's power and the
probationer's rights are defined by the relationship between supervising officer and the
probationer and their competing and legitimate interests in effective supervision and
privacy. Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259; Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-75. The dimensions of these
rights are defined by Fourth Amendment principles, not by some "adhesion contract"

5

An unresolved, or unaddressed, problem with Velasquez lies in the fact that Camara and its
progeny "involved situations where the challenged search was, at least arguably, authorized by
statute or ordinance." State v. Sims, 808 P.2d 141,147 n.ll (Utah App. 1991). Cf. Cornwall, supra
(warrantless search conducted pursuant to administrative order upheld). Velasquez did not discuss
any statutory or administrative authority establishing policies or standards for parole searches. This
is not to say that authoritative policies were not in place or did not establish appropriate standards.
Velasquez simply fails to discuss these policies and, for that matter, fails to discuss this aspect of
the administrative search criteria.
11

which purports to dispense with the Amendment altogether. See LaFave, at 761-62.6
Velasquez and Griffin give these rights dimension in the context of "reasonableness," the
pole star of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
As a final word on the point, we emphasize the limited nature of the
"reasonable suspicion" rule. Searches conducted on that basis by
parole officers can be justified only "'the extent actually necessitated
by the legitimate demands of the operation of the parole process.'"
Velas.quez, 672 P.2d at 1263 (quoting other authorities, emphasis added). These "demands"
establish the parameters of legitimate supervisory policies and must embody explicit
neutral limitations which deny the individual probation officer the power to formulate
arbitrary levels of supervision based only on the officer's own judgment, or worse, his
whim.

These policies must be established by public officials who are "politically

accountable" for them and their enforcement. See State v. Sims, 808 P.2d at 146-47 (noting
"administrative" aspect of suspicion less investigatory roadblocks).
The need to supervise some probationers with more intensity than others is
not disputable. The authority to establish supervisory policies and standards is, by
statute, vested in the Department of Corrections and the Judicial Council. See Utah Code
Ann. §77-18-1 (3)(a).

The departmental policies and standards are so framed as to

accommodate these differing needs without shifting policy-making functions to the

^tie United States Supreme Court has not yet decided a case were it has been asked to uphold
a probation search on a "waiver" theory. Some courts continue to take the position the probationers
can be required to waive all Fourth Amendment rights as a condition of probation. See e.g., State
v. Josephson, 125 Idaho 119, 867 P.2d 993 (App. 1993).
12

individual probation officer. The standards vary with the character of the offense, the
history of the offender, and how long he has been under supervision. See Addendum B.

POINT II
A PROBATIONER IS NOT REQUIRED, BY HIS STATUS,
TO SUBMIT TO SEARCH BY PEACE OFFICERS.
In Velasquez, the defendant questioned the legality of the search of his
apartment, contending that "the parole officers were acting as agents of the police in order
to find incriminating evidence" of a specific crime which was under investigation. 672
P.2d at 1262. The Utah Supreme Court concluded that parole officers had conducted the
search for their own purposes and in the furtherance of their obligation to provide
supervision for parolees. See id. at 1263. In so doing, the court drew the distinction which
should decide the instant case:
Although parolees have diminished Fourth Amendment rights as to
searches by parole officers, that does not mean that police officers
may engage in warrantless searches and seizures as to parolees on the
same basis as parole officers.
Id. at 1262. Cf. Cornwall, 810 P.2d at 486-87. See generally, LaFave, §10.10(e). In their
interaction with probationers, supervising agents sometimes "act in a manner that could
not be tolerated if done by a policeman or other agent of the state with respect to an
ordinary citizen." Velasquez, 672 P.2d at 1259.
In substance and effect, the probation orders entered in both this and the
attempted burglary case would deny defendant any protection from unreasonable searches

13

and seizures. The Fourth Amendment provides protection against governmental intrusion
only. In requiring defendant to submit to search by any peace officer, this condition of
probation completely eclipses the Fourth Amendment.
Velasquez.

It cannot be reconciled with

If for no other reason, a search by police cannot masquerade as an

"administrative search" because, unlike probation officers, police are not operating under
"a general regulatory scheme in furtherance of an administrative purpose, rather than as
part of a criminal investigation to secure evidence of crime." Cornwall, 810 P.2d at 487.
The police do not supervise the general public. They enforce the law.
Velasquez teaches us that a probationer enjoys a substantial measure of
protection under the Fourth Amendment. He cannot be required, as a condition of
obtaining a probationary status, to relinquish the constitutional rights which he is entitled
to enjoy as a probationer. If these are indeed rights, they can be defended against the
prerogative of the Fifth District Court, the Legislature, and any other governmental
authority which thinks it has a better idea than the Fourth Amendment.

POINT III
DEFENDANT DID NOT WAIVE ANY FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION.
The probation agreement which the defendant signed following his
attempted burglary conviction did not indicate that he agreed to search by the police.
Language concerning submission to search by peace officers does not surface until the final
pleadings were signed and entered almost two months after the defendant was sentenced.
14

Even if the extent of defendant's Fourth Amendment rights is to be established by
construction of the "contract" language, still defendant must prevail. It is the state's burden
to establish any alleged waiver. It is a burden the state cannot carry.

CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, it is respectfully submitted that defendant was
under no obligation to submit to warrantless searches by peace officers, the subject search
cannot be sustained on that basis and the district court erred in overruling defendant's
motion to suppress. The judgment of the lower court must be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings. In the event the court should uphold the controlled
substance conviction, that portion of the probation order purporting to require defendant
to submit to warrantless searches by peace officers must be vacated and set aside as an
infringement of the Fourth Amendment rights which defendant enjoys as a probationer.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 9__ day of June, 1997.

m

Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I do hereby certify that on this

/ day of June, 1997,1 did personally mail

two true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to the Utah Attorney
General at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101.

is/
Gary W. Pendleton
Attorney for Appellant
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ADDENDUM A

AMENDMENT IV
[Unreasonable searches and seizures.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon piobable cause, supported by Oath or afTir
mation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized

ADDENDUM B

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION HA"

A

Standatd "A" applies to*
1.
2.
3
4
5.
6.
7.

n.

Ptobation/Parole Administrative cases;
Minimum/Medium Misdemeanor cases;
Appeals cases;
Residential/In-state Custody cases;
Compact Out cases;
Restitution Collection Only cases; and
Telephonic Supervision cases.

ror cases ttsieo aoove as Administrative, Misdemeanor, Appeals, and Telephonic, (he
supervising agent shall:

C.

1.

Conduct an initial interview with the offender;

2.
3.

Review and have the Probation Agreement and other agreements signed;
Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole,
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or
other fees;

4.

Determine appropriatness of supervision via the telephonic reporting piocess,

5.

Instruct the offender to repott by mail/telephone monthly, as instructed;

6.

Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3)
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or Board Parole Older,

7.

Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the
Court or Board;

8.

Advise the Court/Board in the event of:
a.

New criminal law violations; and

b.

Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole Agreement.

For Residential/Ln-state Custody cases, the supervising agent shall:
J,

Develop release plans with the offender a nmiinium of 30 days prior to release, if
release date is known,

2.

("omplete release plans during face-to-face contact with offender five days prior to
release, if leiease date is known; and

.V

As requited, prepare Piogress/Violation Reports, Affidavits and Oiclei to Show
Causes.

O.

Foi Compact Out cases, the supervising agent shall:
1.

Conduct an initial interview with (he offender (if offender is available);

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "A"
Page Two

E

3

Review tind have Piobauon/Parolc and Inter-State Compact Agiecments signed,

4

Review and have Travel Pennit signed,

5

Obtain offender's picture,

6

Initiate Inter-State Compact Request,

7

Advise the Court/Board in the event of
a

New law violations, and

b.

Failure to meet requirements ol the Utah Probation/Parole Agreement or
receiving state's agreement

For Restitution/Collection Only cases, if the supervising agentytechiiician has not
previously supervised the offender, the agent/technictan shall

b

G

1.

Conduct an initial interview with the offender;

2.

Determine amount of restitution owing, if necessary,

3

Develop a payment contract for fines, fees, and/or restitution with the offender,

4.
5.

Complete an opening case entry,
Submit paperwork to the DTO/OS foi processing within thiec (3) working days
of receipt of Court Oidei, when necessary; and

6

Contact victim by phone or letter to explain restitution process

For cases listed in A above as Administrative, Misdemeanor, Appeals, and Telephonic,
supervision should include
1.

Review of the mailed-in report monthly or review of any changes noted in the
telephonic reporting process, and

2.

Case review of additional requirements, including fine, fee, and/or restitution
payments, every 90 days

hot Residential/livstatc Custody cases, supervision should include
1.

One face-to-face contact when umimitment begins,

2

Additional contacts as needed when the offender present* a problem (oi housing
agency or a_s the Court requires, and

I

1 ace-to-face contact only when possible Keogiaphically

Use a designee m

othei icgions when navel is prohibitive
H

JToi Compact Out cases, supeivision should tnc hide
1

Monitoring ol probation/paiolo requirements cvciy () months and

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "A1
Page Tluree

I.

J.

For Restitution/Collection Only cases, supervision should include:
1.

Verifying restitution payments every 30 days;

2.

If no payments are received from the offender, send contact letter and attempt
to contact by phone as follows:
a.

First letter to be sent when payment is 30 days overdue, instructing
offender to respond within two (2) weeks; and

b.

Second letter to be sent if no response is received instructing offender if
no response is received within two (2) weeks, contact with the court will
be made.

3.

If no response is received after second request, submit Progress/Violation
Report to the court outlining options available;

4.

If a change in an offender's address or telephone number occurs, the offender is
required to notify the agent/technician within five (5) days;

5.

For offenders paying regularly, submit report to court for scheduled review
dates and attend court when necessary; and

6.

Upon termination, prepare paperwork and file and submit to DTO/OS. Submit
restitution paperwork to Accounting Teclinician or designee.

File maintenance shall include at least:
i.

One case entry for each offender contact made/received, with a minimum of
one entry every 90 days; Compact Out cases require an entry every six months.

K.

Reassessments shall be required:
L

When a major change occurs; or

2.

At termination from Field Operations.

CUSTODY DEFINITION
• RESIDENTIAL/IN-STATE

-

Offenders who do not qualify

Correct Category

I

1. Parolees in prison after parole violation
report is submitted to the Board Of Pardons
2. Offender in prisons or jails in other states
I
or countries
| 3. Offenders on the streets and CCC residents
not in a treatment program
14, Offenders in Diagnostic

No category, " N "

J

r

Offenders who do qualify

1 . Offenders in jails for more than 30 days
2. Offenders in CCC treatment programs for
more than 9 0 days when approved by
supervising agent (including sex offenders
but excluding MIO)
3. Offenders in residential treatment programs
!
anticipated to be more than 90 days when
|
approved by supervising agent

Fugitive or compact 1
depending on status
Supervision, ISP, Sex J
Offender, etc.
No category
|
Correct category
M

Standard A"
Standard

T

Standard "A"

J

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "B"

A.

U.

C

D.

Standard MB" applies to;
1.
2.

Minimum Felony cases;
Maximum Misdemeanor cases; and

3.

Appeals cases.

The supervising agent shall:
1.
2.

Conduct an initial interview vviili the offender;
Review and have the Probation Agreement signed;

3.

Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole,
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or
other fees;

4.

Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3)
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order;

5.

Make any needed treatment referrals;

6.

Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addcndums, as requested by the
Court;

7.

Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to
policy;

8.

Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests;

9.

Advise the Court in the event of:
a.

New criminal law violations; and

b.

Failure to meet requirements of the Probation Agreement,

Supervision should include:
1.

Offender reporting to the office to submit written monthly report as directed in
Probation Agreement;

2.

A minimum of one facc-to-faec contact with an agent every 90 days; -> ,...-. •••*••"'//]'

3.

Case review of probation requirements every 90 days; and

4.

Collateral contacts as needed.

Vile maintenance shall include at least:
1.

One case enny every 90 days outlining problems or progress, all coll;
information, fine and restitution payments; and

2.

Filing of all written material every 30 days.

'{'

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION MB"
Page Two

Reassessments shall be required:
).

When a major change occurs, i.e., new offense arrest, new conviction, release
agreement violation, commitment;

2.

Every nine months when the status lemains unchanged;

3.

On minimum felony cases, only at termination from Field Operations if no
major changes occur; and

4.

At termination from Field Operations.

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "(7

A.

B.

C.

Standard "C" applies to:
1.
2.
3.

Medium Felony cases;
Minimum Parole cases,
Sex Offender 111 cases; and

4.

Appeals cases.

The supervising agent shall;
1.

Conduct an initial interview with the offender;

2.
3.

Review and have the Probation/Parole Agreement signed;
Write an opening summary, which shall include cotiditions of probation/parole,
other pertinent infonnation, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or
other fees;

4.

Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3)
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or 24 hours from parole;

5.

Make any needed treatment referrals;

6.

Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the
Court/Board;

7.

Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to
policy;

8.

Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests, and

9.

Advise the Court/Board in the event of:
a.

New criminal law violations; and

b.

Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole Agreement.

Supervision should include:
1.

Offender reporting to the office to submit written monthly
the Probation/Parole Agreement;

2.

A minimum of one face-to-face contact every 60 days witl
office or the
field,

,

/ . •:
,• "

(

I

3.

A minimum of one field visit every 90 days by an agent;

4.

Case review of probation/paiolc icquircments monthly, with emphasis on
residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, lesiUulion, and education; and

5.

Collateral contacts as needed.

!'-•

'

r

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "C
Page Two

D.

File maintenance shall include at least
J.

One case entry every 00 days, oudiiiing problems or progress, all collateral
information, fine and restitution payments, and

2.
E.

Filing of all written material every W days

Reassessments shall be required:
1.
When a major change occurs, i.e., new offense arrest, new conviction, rclca.se
agreement violation, commitment;
2.

Every nine months when the status remains unchanged; (for minimum parole, if
no changes occur, only at termination); and

3.

At termination from Field Operations.

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "D"

A.

Standard °D" applies to:
1.
2.
3.
4.

B.

C.

Maximum Felony cases;
Medium Parole cases;
Sex Offender II cases; and
Appeals cases.

ITie supervising agent shall:
1.

Conduct an initial interview with the offender;

2.

Review and have the Probation/Parole Agreement signed;

3.

Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole,
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or
other fees;

4.

Complete an opening case entry;

5.

Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within tlirce (3)
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or within 24 hours from
parole;

6.

Make any needed treatment referrals;

7.

Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the
Court/Board;

8.

Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to
policy;

9.

Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests;

10.

Advise the Court/Board in the event of:
a.

New criminal law violations; and

b.

Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole.

Supervision should include:
1.

Offender reporting to the office to submit written monthly report as di
the Probation/Parole Agreement;
^. V

2.

A minimum of one field visit every 60 days by the supervising agrnt;

4.

Case tevicw of probatum/parole requirements monthly, with emphasis <
residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, restitution and education;

5.

Collateral contacts as needed.

'

r
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STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "P"
Page Two

D.

H.

File maintenance shall include at least:
1.

One case entry every 30 days, outlining problems or progress, all collaietal
information, fine and restitution payments; and

2.

Filing of all written material every 30 days.

Reassessments shall be required;
1.

When a major change occurs, i e. new offense anesl, new conviction, release
agreement violation, commitment;

2.

Every nine months when the status remains unchanged; and

3.

At termination from Field Operations.

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION ME"

A.

Standard "E" applies to:
1.
2.
3.
4.

B.

C.

Maximum Parole case**,
Sex Offender 1 cases;
Special Needs Offendei cases, and
Appeals cases.

The supervising agent shall
1.

Conduct an initial interview with the offender,

2.

Review and have the Probation/Parole Agreement signed;

3.

Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole,
other pertinent infonnation, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or
other fees;

4.

For sex offenders, review the Sex Offender Registration form to ensure accuracy,
update 05 needed, or prepare a new form or original registration as needed;

5.

Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3)
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or 24 hours from parole;

6.

Make any needed treatment referrals;

7.

Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the
Court/Board;

8.

Complete violation investigations and revocation procedures according to policy;

9.

Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests;

10.

Advise ihc Court/Board in the event of:
a.

New criminal law violations; and

b.

Failure to meet requirements of the Probation/Parole Agreement.

Supervision should include.
I.

Offender reporting to ihc office to submit written /nonthly report as directed in the
Probation/Parole Agreement;

2.

A minimum of one field visit every ^0 days by the supervising agent(s) - ^ '

3.

Case tevicw of prohatmn/patole requuements monthly, with emphasis <
residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, lcsiitution and education

4.

Collateral contacts as needed

<(

(
\''

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION MRH
Page Two

D.

B

File maintenance shall include at least:
1.

One case entry every 30 days, outlining problems or progress, all collateral
information, fines and lestitution payments; and

2.

Filing of all written material every 30 days.

Reassessments shall be required:
1.

When a major change occurs, i.e., new offense arrest, new conviction, release
agreement violation, commitment;

2.

Every nine months when the status remains unchanged; and

3.

At termination from Field Operations.

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION
SEX OFFENDER H AND HI ["CM and "DM] CRITERIA

A.

AU Sex Offenders shall be supervised at Standard of Supervision "E" fur the first nine (9)
months of supervision.

B.

Supervision at Standard "D" may occur when die offender meets all of the following
cuteria:
1.

The offender has been under supei'vision for nine (9) months;

2.

The offender's reassessment places him at Medium or Minimum; and

3.

The offender has been involved in approved treatment for the entire
probation/parole period and the agent has received positive progress reports or the
offender has been successfully terminated from treatment;
OR

C.

4.

The offender has successfully completed an approved inpatient treatment program
and has been out for six (6) months, has continued in outpatient treatment and the
agent has received positive progress reports; and

5.

With the approval of the agent's supervisor.

Supervision at Standard "C" may occur when the offender meets all of the following
criteria:
1.

The offender has been under supei'vision at Standard MD" for nine (9) months;

2.

The offender's reassessment places him at Medium or Minimum;

3.

The offender has been involved in approved treatment for the entire
probation/parole period and the agent has received positive progress reports or the
offender has been successfully terminated from treatment; and

4.

With the approval of the agent's supervisor.

D.

If the offender discontinues treatment without prior approval from his supervising agent
and therapist or if leports fiom the therapist indicate problems, supervision shall be
Standard V \

E.

If the offender does not become involved in apptoved treatment, the supervision standard
shall be Standard "E".

b-

If Contacts with family members or associates indicate problems, the supervision standard
.shall be Standard "E".

CRITERIA FOR SPECIAL NEEDS OFFENDER CATEGORY

A.

All Special Needs offenders shaJJ be supervised at Standard of Supervision "E".

B

In oidcr for an offender to be placed in the category Special Needs, an agent must receive
a written diagnostic report, not older than three years, from a psychiatrist (MD), a
psychologist (PhD) 01 a Social Worker (DSW or MSW); and

C.

The Special Needs offender must have been diagnosed with ont or more of the following
disorders:

D.

1.

Schizophrenia (includes paranoid, indiffcrentiated, disorganized, catatonic);

2.

Delusional disorders, chronic in nature, not substance abuse related;

3.

Psychotic disorders not otherwise defined;

4.

Bipolar disorder (manic depiessive illness); or

5.

Organic Brain Syndrome (OBS).

The Special Needs offender category shall not be used for any offender not meeting the
above criteria.

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION " F

Standard "P" applies to:
1.

Fugitive cases.

Paiole Fugitives.
1.

The agent or designee shall continue efforts to locate the fugitive by
a.

Contacting family, friends, employers;

b.

Obtaining a current rap sheet to check for any new arrest and the
geographic area in wliich they occurred;

c.

Use any other reasonable means to attempt to locate the parolee; and

d.

Provide local law enforcement with any relevant information to assist in
the apprehension of the individual.

2.

All attempts to locate shall be documented in the case history file.

3.

Attempts to locate shall be done in accordance with the following schedule:
a.

Every $Lx months for the first tliree years;

b.

Every twelve months from three to five year's; and

c.

Every two years from five plus years.

4.

The supervisor in charge of fugitives shall make a determination as to whether the
Board of Patxlons and Parole should be approached concemmg recall of the
warrant and termination of parole.

5.

Cases wliich fall into the following areas shall jiot be brought back before the
Board for consideration of warrant recall:
a.

Cases in which the crime for which the individual was paroled is of a
violent nature or there is a history of viol<>nc<v

b.

Caoco which have pending criminaJ charges, unices lliu^c Ui*ugc;> tuc uf »t

minor or misdemeanor nature and arc non-extraditable offenses;

6.

c.

Cases in which there is substantial restitution balance and the victim(s) can
be located; and/or

d

Cases winch arc high profile cases of notoiiety that cause concern within
the community.

If the decision is made to maintain the case on fugitive status, the fugitive agenr
shall continue efforts to locate as previously described

SENT BY:

10- 3-95 ;

11:20 ;

FIELD OP ADMIN. -
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STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "F"
Page Two

C.

Felony Fugitives:
1.

The fugitive agent or his designee shall continue efforts to locate the fugitive by.
a

Contacting family, lncnds, employers;

b.

Obtaining a cuirent rap sheet to check for any new arrests and to determine
the gcograpliical aiea in winch they occuned,

c.

Use any other reasonable means to attempt to locate the offender; and

d.

Provide local law enforcement with any relevant information to assist m
the apprehension of the offender.

2.

AU attempts to locate shall be documented in the case history file.

3.

Attempts to locate shall be done in accordance with the following schedule:

4.

5.

a.

Every six months for the first year; and

b.

Every twelve months from one to three years.

The supervisor in charge of fugitives shall make a deteimination as to whether the
Court should be approached concerning recall of the warrant and teiiiiination of
probation.
C n ^ A H whirtV* frtll I n t o tUr
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Court for consideration:
a.

Cases hi which the uimr for which (he offender was placed on piobation
*c o r c\ **i.oLo»vt

*>•

rtdtu^j

o r t i \ o r » tA A t-v*^>*o »-y o r v i o l o i ^ c c ,

b.

Cases which have pending criminal charges unless those charges are of a
minor or misdemeanor nature and are non-extraditable offenses;

c.

Cases in which there is substantial restitution balance and the
victim/victims can still be located; and/or

d.

O a 3 C S W h i c h tUC l l i e h n m f i l c . C I S C * o f O O l O i i i l v fli,if i - m v f «-orwr>rn tu-irhin
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STANDARD OF SUPERVISION T
Page Ttirec

D.
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Misdemeanor Fugitives:

" ^ - V ^ T

1.

At the time a probationer discontinues repor
agent shall make reasonable attempts to loci
two of the following:

A , ^ v ^
() v | )
|
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a.

L ^ ; ^
II

Make a field visit or sending a cont*
to venty the living arrangements;

^

^

^

^
Jj

^

^
i

b.

Contact the offender's family member anu menu^ ciuici uj tcicpnuuu ui
mail to obtain information as to his whereabouts;

c.

Contact the most recent employer either by phone or moil to verify
employment status;

d.

If unemployed, contact the last known employer to determine the reason
for termination and any forwarding address information if available;

e.

Contact the thcrnpbt or other interested pi\/fc&MUiial& fui any infunnadon

or contacts they may be able to provide; and
t

0399

Take any other reasonable steps necessary or available to ohtam the
information.

2.

All of the above attempts to locate shall be documented in die case history of the
offender's file.

3.

Notify the Court of the attempts made to locate die fugitive, request a warrant be
issued, and close the fdc.

4.

Cases which fall into the following areas shall not be brought back before the
Court for consideration:
a.

Cases in which the crime foj which the offender was placed on probation
is of a violent nature or there is a history of violent behavior;

b.

Cases which have pending criminal charges unless those.charges are of a
minor nature or a misdemeanor offense and are non-extraditable offenses;

c.

Cases in which them is substantial restitution balance and the
victim/victims can be located; and/or

d

Cases which aie high profile cases of notoriety that cause, concern in the
conununity.
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STANDARD OF SUPERVISION "G"

A.

C.

Standard "G" applies to:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Intensive Supervision Parole;
Intensive Supervision Probation;
Intensive Drug Supervision Program (IDS): and
Appeals cases.

1.

Screen and staff all incoming referrals, determine any special offender conditions,
prepare documentation of acceptance of conditions, and send to referring agent;

2.

Conduct initial interview and orientation with the offender;

3.

Review and have the ISP/TDS Agreement and Probation/Parole Agreement signed,
including any special conditions;

4.

Write an opening summary, which shall include conditions of probation/parole,
other pertinent information, and a payment contract for fines, restitution, and/or
other fees;

5.

Make any needed treatment referrals;

6.

Obtain offender photographs;

7.

Submit opening paperwork to the DTO/OS for processing within three (3)
working days of receipt of Court Probation Order or within 24 hours from parole;

8.

Complete Presentence Investigation Reports or Addendums, as requested by the
Court/Board;

9.

Check the jail booking sheets for new arrests; and

10.

Advise the Court/Board in die event of:
a.

New criminal law violations;

b.

Failure to i

c.

Failure to i

DS Agreement; and

v

'

/

v

Supervision should includ
I.

V

PHASE I

\ r.*

ition/Parole Agreement.

c

/

a.

A minimum of four field visits per month by an agent for ISP cases, tluec
per month for IDS cases (electronic monitoring may be used to satisfy
one-half of the required field visits);

b.

Tliree random drug screeds per month for IDS cases;

STANDARD OF SUPERVISION MG"
Page Two
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e.

Verification of employment two times per month;

)• \

f.

Surveillance when called for;

,
j
V

g.

Review of probatioii/parolc/ISP/IDS requirements once per month, with
emphasis on residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, restitution and
education;

h.

Collateral contacts as needed;

i.

Electronic monitoring as ordered; and

j.

Four police intelligence checks pei month for IDS cases.

j '*'

2.

D,

E.

If unemployed, one face-to-face contact Monday through Friday with an
agent or ISP teclinician;

PHASE II
a.

A minimum of two face-to-face office visits per month with an agent or
ISP technician for ISP cases, one per month for IDS cases;

b.

Two random drug screens per month for IDS cases;

c.

A minimum of two face-to-face field visits per month with an agent
(electronic monitoring may be use to satisfy one-half of the required field
visits);

d.

Review of probation/parole/ISP/IDS requirements once per month, with
emphasis on residence, employment, treatment, fines, fees, restitution and
education;

e.

Surveillance when called for;

f.

Electronic monitoring as ordered; and

g.

Two police intelligence checks per month for IDS cases.

File maintenance shall include:
1.

One case entry for each transaction;

2.

A monthly entry outlining progress or problems in the case plan, collateral
information, fine and restitution payments; and

3.

Filing of all written material bi-weekly.

Reassessments shall be required:
1.

When a major change occurs, i.e. new offense arrest, new conviction, release
agreement violation, commitment;

2.
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DEPARTOEhTrd"F"C0RP^CTIONS

xfth D i s t r i c t

PROBATIO^^REEMENT

Washington

Court

County

951500040

00081991

Case#

OBSCIS#

i Dax Brant Hammer
, agree to be directed and supervised by Agents of the Department of Corrections and to be
accountable for my actions and conduct to the Department of Corrections and the Court.
I further agree to abide by all conditions of probation as ordered by the court and set forth in this Agreement, consistent with the laws of the
state of Utah. I fully understand that violation of this agreement and/or any conditions thereof, or any new conviction for a crime, may result in
action by the Court causing my probation to be revoked or my probation period to commence again.
1. VISITS:

I will permit visits to my place of residence, my place of employment or elsewhere by Agents of Adult Probation and
Parole for the purpose of ensuring compliance with the conditions of my Probation Agreement.

2 REPORTING
REQUIREMENTS:

I will not abscond from Probation Supervision.
REPORTING:
I will report as directed by the Department of Corrections.
RESIDENCE:
I will establish and reside at a residence of record and will not change my residence without
first obtaining permission from my Probation Agent.
LEAVING THE STATE: I will not leave the state of Utah, even briefly, or any other state to which I am
released or transferred without prior written permission from my Probation Agent.
Reporting Instructions:

v^

I will report with in the first five working days of each month and meet
with my snpprvising agent in person as wel 1 as providing a writtpn rpport.

3. CONDUCT:

I will obey all State, Federal and Municipal laws. IF ARRESTED, CITED, or QUESTIONED by a peace officer, I will notify
my Probation Agent within 48 hours.

4. WEAPONS:

I will not possess, have under my control, in my custody or on the premises where I reside, any EXPLOSIVES.
FIREARMS or DANGEROUS WEAPONS. (Dangerous weapon is defined as any item that in the manner of its use or
intended use is capable o\ causing death or serious bodily injury.) Exceptions to this condition may be made by the
supervising agent and must be in writing. This waiver will only apply to individuals on probation for a misdemeanor and
who have never been convicted of a felony.

5. CHEMICAL ANALYSIS:

I shall abstain from the illegal use, possession, control, delivery, production, manufacture or distribution of controlled
substances (58-37-2 U.C.A.) and I will submit to tests of my BREATH or BODY FLUIDS to ensure compliance with my
Probation Agreement.

6. SEARCHES:

I will permit Agents of Adult Probation and Parole to search my PERSON, RESIDENCE, VEHICLE or any other property
under my control, without a warrant, at any time, day or night, upon reasonable suspicion to ensure compliance with the
conditions of my Probation Agreement.

7. ASSOCIATION:

I will not knowingly associate with any person who is involved in CRIMINAL activity or who has been CONVICTED OF A
FELONY without approval from my Probation Agent.

8. EMPLOYMENT:

Unless otherwise authorized by my Probation Agent, I will SEEK, OBTAIN and MAINTAIN verifiable, lawful, full-time
employment (32 hours per week minimum) as approved by my Probation Agent. I will notify my Probation Agent of any
change in my employment within 48 hours of the change.

9. TRUTHFULNESS:

I will be cooperative, compliant and truthful in all my dealings with Adult Probation & Parole.

10. SUPERVISION FEE:

I agree to pay a supervision fee of $30 per month unless granted a waiver by the Department under the provisions of
Utah Statute 64-13-21.

1 V\ SPECIAL CONDITIONS:

IvKfai
Maintain Full-Time Employment or Edu.
AW&gerve 66 davs in j a i l with c r e d i t for time served.
plete a Substance Abiise Evaluation with SWUMH A/D and follow all recommendations.
bmit to random tests of breath or bodily fluids, and random searches of person and property.
Efflfot use or possess any alcohol or illegal drugs. y+YReport all perscriptions to APSP with in
24 hours is iss\xe_.<J^< Pav a fine in the amount of 1.157.00 directly to the 5th District Court.
I have read, understand and agree to be bound by this agreement. If I violate any of the conditions of this agreement, the Court may revoke my
Probation or the Department of Corrections may take other appropriate action against me, and I hereby acknowledge receipt of a copy of this
agreement.
Dated this /O'th
finessed By:
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